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The Importance of Being Active
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Abstract: The successful stimulus-response approach to the organization of behavior has been the dominating paradigm for much of
the psychology and neuroscience of the 20th century. Martin Heisenberg is a pioneer in championing the idea that all brains, even
comparatively simple ones such as those of insects, instead operate according to output-input principles. Since the 1970s, his research
produces evidence that the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster, is capable of spontaneous behavioral activity, and that the flies use it to
control sensory input (i.e., operant behavior). Today, more and more evidence is accumulating also from fields outside of neuroscience
that, indeed, one of the common, defining principles of all brains is this concept of operant behavior. Drawing from this evidence, it
becomes clear that the conceptually simple process of generating activity and evaluating its consequences forms one of the fundamental
cornerstones not only for all of our human nature, but also for our social coherence. This review recapitulates Heisenberg’s most critical
experiments and provides an overview over the current literature on the role of spontaneous activity in the ecology and evolution of
brains. I conclude that spontaneous activity is both a necessary prerequisite and an inevitable consequence of evolution.
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Probably one of the*if not the best-understood sensory
system is the fly visual system. Over the last 60 years or
so, on all levels of complexity, the systems, the single cell
and, more recently, even the molecular level, neuroscien-
tists have developed an understanding that is unparalleled
both in breadth and in depth. The groundwork was laid by
the early works of Go¨tz, Reichardt, and other colleagues
in the tradition of biological cybernetics (Go¨tz, 1964,
1965, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1980; Go¨tz and Buchner, 1978;
Go¨tz et al., 1979; Kirschfeld and Reichardt, 1970;
Poggio and Reichardt, 1973a, 1973b; Poggio and
Reichardt, 1976a, 1976b; Reichardt, 1962; Reichardt
and Poggio, 1975, 1976; Reichardt and Wenking, 1969;
Reichardt, 1965; Wehrhahn and Reichardt, 1973). This
tradition entailed to study the visual system with the tools
of control theory. In principle, this meant interpreting
such experiments as manipulating a complex input-output
system. The idea behind this very successful black-box
approach was to study the input-output relationships
thoroughly enough to be able to construct a control
model that could predict the motor output of the fly for
any, even yet untested, visual input. One method of
choice was often the so-called open-loop experiment, in
which the tethered fly (Figure 1) received visual input
while its motor output was recorded. Importantly, the
motor output was not allowed to interfere with the
presentation of the stimuli (i.e., the feedback loop
between the animal’s behavior and its environment was
open). This was the time when the young geneticist,
Martin Heisenberg, joined this exciting field after his
postdoctoral period with Seymour Benzer at CalTech.
Heisenberg’s contributions to vision in Drosophila are
covered elsewhere in this issue, so I will not go into any
detail here. This input-output approach worked extremely
well, and not only for biological cybernetics of visual
guidance of insect flight. Many other areas of neurobiol-
ogy, at the time, also thought of brains as input-output
systems and prevented the behavior of their animals to
interfere with their stimulus situation. In fact, so success-
ful was this pervasive approach that until very recently,
some neurobiologists still emphasized that ‘‘brain func-
tion is ultimately best understood in terms of input/
output transformations and how they are produced’’
(Mauk, 2000). This was the dominant tradition in which
Heisenberg was working when he moved to Wu¨rzburg to
become the chair of the department of genetics in 1975.
In Wu¨rzburg, several discoveries prompted Heisen-
berg to radically change his view on brains. Three of
these, in particular, were instrumental for his 180-degree
turn. First was the observation that even without any
variation in sensory input, the flies would produce
varying motor output (Figure 2; Heisenberg and Wolf,
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1979). This finding flew in the face of every control
theory thus far. A later mathematical analysis of the
temporal structure of the flies’ behavior in this situation
(Maye et al., 2007) confirmed Heisenberg’s interpretation
that the variability in the behavior of the fly
does not stem from a very noisy input-output system,
but was generated actively by the fly, independently of
any input (i.e., ‘‘initiating activity’’; Heisenberg, 1983,
1994). Importantly, Maye et al. (2007) found the same
kind of variability in the behavior even when the flies
were allowed to control their environment with the
feedback loop closed. The second discovery was made
with the double-mutant, reduced optic lobes (rol), small
optic lobes (sol) (Figure 3). Freely walking or flying wild-
ype flies, in a visually structured rotating environment,
have a tendency to turn with the direction of the
movement. The rol sol double mutant flies still show
phototaxis, but are completely devoid of any such
directed ‘‘optomotor response.’’ The optomotor response
was thought to be critical for stabilizing the animal in
flight, and thus rol sol flies were expected to lack the
capacity to use moving visual stimuli for course control
and thus should show unstable flight. However, in
experiments with tethered flies where the feedback loop
between turning behavior and horizontal rotation of the
environment was closed, rol sol mutant flies were able to
stabilize their flight with respect to visual landmarks and
fly straight (i.e., establish optomotor balance; Wolf &
Heisenberg, 1986). The interpretation was that rol sol
mutant flies are motion sensitive but lacked sensitivity to
the direction of motion. This was demonstrated by
performing the third critical experiment (Figure 4). After
inversion of the feedback loop between behavior and
environment, such that attempted left turns lead to a left
turn of the environment and thus the visual impression of
a right turn, rol sol mutants did not require any more time
to stabilize their flight and fly straight than when then
loop was closed ‘‘correctly.’’ The conclusion that flies are
actively initiating activity in order to ‘‘try out’’ which
motor output controls the environment was confirmed
when wild-type flies were subjected to this ‘‘inverting
goggles’’ experiment. Even wild-type flies, with their
optomotor response intact, eventually learned to use
turning maneuvers of the ‘‘opposite’’ direction to control
flight, that is, left-turning maneuvers for the visual
impression of right turns and vice versa (Heisenberg
and Wolf, 1984; Wolf et al., 1992). These three experi-
ments attacked contemporary control theory from two
ends: not only was output not predictable from input, but
eliminating the open-loop response or inverting its
direction could be compensated by plasticity in the
system, such that it would still perform the function in
question. Not only were the open loop situations an
Figure 1. A Drosophila fruit fly, suspended at a copper hook,
attached to the head and thorax of the fly by a small drop of glue.
Figure 2. Measuring fruit fly spontaneity in a uniform, constant
environment. (A) The fly is flying stationarily in a cylindrical
arena homogeneously illuminated from behind. The fly’s ten-
dency to perform left or right turns (yaw torque) is measured
continuously and fed into the computer. (B) Example of yaw
torque data. Lower trace is a 5-minute enlargement of the 30-
minute upper trace. Variability in two components of the behavior
can be observed: slow baseline fluctuations and fast, super-
imposed torque spikes. Torque spikes correspond to body
saccades in free flight.
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inadequate experimental approach, but the input-output
assumption itself proved inadequate as a theoretical
construct for understanding even a fly brain. These
experiments prompted Heisenberg to abandon this perva-
sive, successful approach and pursue a radically different
research direction: how animals use their capacity for
initiating output to control their sensory input. Today, 30
years later, more and more evidence*not only from
neuroscience*is accumulating that while computing
input-output relations may be an important feature of
brains, computing such output-input relations (e.g., in so-
called forward models; Webb, 2004) is probably equally,
if not more, fundamental to the organization of behavior.
In the remainder of this paper, I will try to provide a short
sketch of the literature today that is supporting Heisen-
berg’s early insight.
If we allow ourselves to anthropomorphize, Heisen-
berg’s observation that flies with a constant stimulus
situation still produce variable behaviors may not be all
that surprising. We have all experienced how difficult it is
to stay absolutely still, maybe even how horrible it feels to
be forced not to move. We want to move and we want to
decide what body part to move when and where the
movement should go. We all feel the very basic notion
that we possess a certain flexibility in our choices
(Montague, 2008). Bereaving humans of such freedom
is frequently used as punishment, and the bereft do
invariably perceive this limited freedom as undesirable.
This experience of freedom is an important characteristic
of what it is like to be human. It stems, in part, from our
ability to behave variably. Voltaire expressed this intui-
tion in saying, ‘‘Liberty then is only and can be only the
power to do what one will’’ (Voltaire, 1752/1924).
However the concept that we can decide to behave
differently, even under identical circumstances, underlies
not only our justice systems, but our electoral systems,
educational systems, parenting, and, basically, all other
social systems also presuppose behavioral variability and
at least a certain degree of freedom of choice. Games and
sports would be predictable and boring without our ability
of constantly changing our behavior in always the same
settings. Faced with novel situations, humans and most
animals increase their behavioral variability (Bunzeck and
Duzel, 2006; Roberts and Gharib, 2006; Shahan and
Chase, 2002). Animals even vary their behavior when a
more stereotyped behavior would be more efficient
(Krechevsky, 1937). Inasmuch as behavioral variability
between individuals has genetic components, it is a
crucial factor of niche exploitation in evolution. More-
over, behavioral variability within individuals has been
shown to be ecologically advantageous in game theore-
tical studies (Brembs, 1996; Glimcher, 2003, 2005;
Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; McNamara et al., 2004;
Platt, 2004), in pursuit-evasion contests such as predator-
prey interactions (‘‘protean strategy’’) (Driver and
Humphries, 1988; Grobstein, 1994; Miller, 1997; Shultz
and Dunbar, 2006), in exploration and foraging (Belanger
and Willis, 1996; Viswanathan et al., 1999), in mobbing
attack patterns by birds, and in the variation of male
songbirds’ songs (Neuringer, 2004). Clearly, invariable
behavior will be exploited (Jablonski and Strausfeld,
2000, 2001; Miller, 1997) and leaves an organism
helpless in unpredictable situations (Greenspan, 2005;
Heisenberg, 1994).
Figure 3. Frontal sections of wild-type (WT) and rol sol
mutant brains. In rol sol flies, the optic lobes have about 12% of
the wild-type volume. The remaining structures are retinotopi-
cally organized with the normal number of ommatidia in the
eye and columns in the neuropil. Images courtesy of Martin
Heisenberg.
Figure 4. ‘‘Inverting goggles’’ experiment. Whenever the
tethered fly attempts a turning maneuver, the fly’s visual
panorama is rotated in the same direction. In the depicted
example, a right-turning maneuver leads to a rotation of the
panorama to the right. In this situation, any attempts of the fly
to follow the stripe will lead to a catastrophic feedback of
increasing speed of the stripe and yaw torque of the fly in the
same direction. Nevertheless, flies learn to generate turning
maneuvers in the opposite direction in order to establish a zero
net rotation of the stripe (optomotor balance). Fly drawing
courtesy of Reinhard Wolf.
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Thus, competitive success and evolutionary fitness of
all ambulatory organisms rely critically on intact beha-
vioral variability as an adaptive brain function. But,
relative freedom from environmental contingencies is a
necessary, but most often not a sufficient, criterion for
such accomplishments. Tightly connected to the ability to
produce variable behavior is the ability to use the effects
of these behaviors to control the environment. The
incoming stream of sensory information is noisy and
fluctuates for any number of reasons. Any covariance
between the behavioral variations and those of sensory
input indicates that the latter are consequences of the
behavior and can thus be controlled be the animal (Bays
et al., 2006; Wegner, 2002). Every animal relies heavily
on this on-line detection system for when the animal itself
is the reason for any environmental fluctuation. This
function is so paramount that we humans express our
delight over control of our environment (including other
people) already as children, by, for example, shrieking in
excitement when Dad jumps after a ‘‘boo’’ or proudly
presenting Mom with ‘‘look what I can do!’’. Later,
children find pleasure in building airplane models,
become carpenters with a delight for shaping wood,
artists feeling gratified creating art out of the simplest
materials, musicians enjoying mastering their instrument
to perfection, athletes, scientists, engineers, managers, or
cunning politicians. Using trial and error, we have shaped
our world from caves to skyscrapers, from horses to jet
planes, from spears to hydrogen bombs. Cultural or
religious rituals (e.g., rain dance) and superstition may
have developed as a means to create a feeling of control
where, ultimately, there is none. Clearly, behaving
flexibly in order to control our environment is at the
heart of human nature and probably affects more aspects
of our daily lives than any other brain function. So
essential is such functioning that even very simple brains
possess it. Even Drosophila prefers a situation in which it
controls its environment over one where it does not. If
certain flight directions are experimentally superimposed
with uncontrollable visual movements, flies quickly avoid
such directions and fly only in areas of full control
(Heisenberg et al., 2001). This experiment demonstrates
that control over environmental stimuli is inherently
rewarding already for numerically simple, but very likely
also for all other, brains. The same experiment also helps
to understand how the rol sol mutants managed to fly
straight: The flies spontaneously varied their motor output
(‘‘trying out’’) until they could control absolute move-
ment (i.e., independently of direction) in their environ-
ment. Obviously, rol sol mutants are using an operant
strategy to control their stimulus situation (Wolf and
Heisenberg, 1986). The same strategy also must underlie
the capacity of wild-type flies to master the ‘‘inverting
goggles’’ experiment.
By detecting what component of the sensory stream
is controlled by our own actions, operant behavior also
underlies the distinction between observing and doing
(i.e., differentiating between self and non-self). It is
thought that one of the main principles behind operant
behavior is the so-called reafference principle (Todorov,
2004; von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950; Webb, 2004). We
compare our behavioral output (efference) with incoming
sensory input (afference) to detect when we are the ones
authoring environmental change (Bays et al., 2006;
Wegner, 2002; Wolf and Heisenberg, 1991). One almost
iconographic example of such behavior is to perform
various spontaneous movements in front of a mirror to
detect whether it is us we are perceiving. Even animals
perform such movements in front of a mirror (Plotnik
et al., 2006; Prior et al., 2008; Reiss and Marino, 2001).
This automatic detection mechanism explains why we
cannot tickle ourselves (Bays et al., 2006), why we
perceive a stable visual world despite our frequent quick,
or saccadic, eye movements (Sommer and Wurtz, 2006),
and is reflected in different brain-activation patterns
between self-generated and exogenous visual stimulation
(Matsuzawa et al., 2005). It is thought that the detection
is accomplished via an efference copy (or corollary
discharge) of the motor command, which is compared
to incoming afferent signals to distinguish re- from ex-
afference. Such a differentiation has been implied to
demonstrate causal reasoning in rats (Blaisdell et al.,
2006; Clayton and Dickinson, 2006; Waldmann et al.,
2006). Even robots can use such ‘‘self-modeling’’ to
generate a continuously updated model of themselves and
their environment (Bongard et al., 2006). The brain, then,
uses this model to predict the sensory consequences of
behavior, and the integration of this prediction with the
actual sensory information is used to produce an estimate
of sensory space that is enhanced over predictions from
either ex- or reafferent stimulation alone (Vaziri et al.,
2006). This effect of operant enhancement of sensory
cues can be observed also in the fruit fly (Brembs and
Plendl, 2008; Heisenberg et al., 2001), monkey (Kornell
and Terrace, 2007), human (James, 1890; Slamecka and
Graf, 1978), and robot (Gutnisky and Zanutto, 2004b)
learning and may explain why starlings, but not tamarin
monkeys, can recognize patterns defined by so-called
recursive grammar (Marcus, 2006). Such control of
sensory input has often been termed ‘‘goal-directed’’
behavior or action. At its basis lies the capacity to
generate spontaneous variability: initiating activity. This
perspective provides an intuitive understanding of the
rewarding properties of being in control of the environ-
ment. Setting and obtaining goals is inherently rewarding
(Kim et al., 2006). This reward ensures that individuals
always actively strive to control. Expecting sensory
feedback signals can go so far that willing to move a
limb can lead to the illusion of limb movement, even if
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none occurred (Gandevia et al., 2006). One may also say
that we so want our actions to have an effect that we
sometimes develop a bad conscience even when we have
not done anything wrong.
At the same time, by controlling the environmental
input by using operant feedback loops, individuals exert
their effect not only on themselves, but their survival and
procreation in the environment they shape for themselves
directly affects evolution. This has been shown in the
field, for example, for western bluebirds, which dissociate
into different niches according to their level of aggression
(Duckworth, 2006). In humans, such mechanisms have
been proposed to explain otherwise hard-to-understand
phenomena, such as high IQ heritability estimates and
associated paradoxa (i.e., increasing IQ heritability with
age/experience and the ‘‘Flynn effect’’ of increasing IQ
over generations) (Dickens and Flynn, 2001; Toga and
Thompson, 2005). Another good example is the evolution
of brain size. Most inter- and intraspecific interactions can
be conceptualized as pursuit-evasion contests (e.g., pre-
dator/prey, male/female, dominant/subordinate, etc.).
There are two reports on such contests leading to
increased brain size. The first details how small-brained
prey are more likely to be caught by predators, pre-
sumably because their capacity for behavioral variability
is also smaller (Shultz and Dunbar, 2006). The second
shows that the largest relative brain sizes among primate
species are associated with monogamous mating systems,
raising the suspicion that unpredictable mating strategies
are the most successful ones in monogamous species
(Schillaci, 2006). Other research in birds ties the evolu-
tion of brain size both to behavioral variability and
migration: birds with larger brains are both more likely
to be sedentary and cope better in novel environments.
The hypothesis here is that a sedentary lifestyle in
seasonally changing habitats requires significant beha-
vioral flexibility. Operant feedback provides flexible birds
with more resources, which enable them to support larger
brains, which, in turn, generate more behavioral varia-
bility: Brain size and behavioral flexibility coevolved to
outcompete other, smaller-brained birds that migrate in
order to survive (Pravosudov et al., 2007; Sol et al.,
2005a,b). Thus, the interdependence of brain size, the
level of behavioral variability it provides, and the energy
supply by which it is constrained are starting to unravel.
CONCLUSIONS
With this short overview, I hope to have shown that
without initiating activity, there would not be any brains
for us to study. Such spontaneous activity is both a
necessary prerequisite and an inevitable consequence of
evolution. Ultimately, the conceptually simple process of
generating activity and evaluating its consequences forms
one of the fundamental cornerstones not only for all of
our human nature, but also for our social coherence:
human nature as described in planning, willing, and
controlling our behavior (Frith et al., 1991; Knight et al.,
1995; Lezak, 1995; Owen, 1997; Wegner, 2002) and our
social coherence, as based on cooperation (Gutnisky and
Zanutto, 2004a; McNamara et al., 2004; Sanabria et al.,
2003). Martin Heisenberg is a visionary and a pioneer in
the neurobiological study of these and related neural
processes. Only recently has his view of the primarily
active nature of brains started to gain a more widespread
acceptance among biologists.
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